More importantly, how and why did it happen?

Asking the right question matters.

The “right” question is not “Whose fault was that?” but “Why did it happen?”, because this is the question which will allow us to learn and hopefully mitigate similar events in the future.

But before we start asking those, let’s review what actually occurred because this recent event at KJFK/New York is not only an extremely serious one, but one which is occurring with alarming regularity, particularly in the USA. This article from FlightGlobal highlights what is a growing area of concern.

The Incident

On April 17, 2024, a Swiss Air flight was cleared for takeoff from runway 04L at KJFK/New York, but rejected the takeoff due to “traffic on the runway”. 

• Swiss was cleared to line up at wait 04L, full length
• Delta was cleared to cross at H
• Swiss was cleared for takeoff
• Delta was cleared to cross at G
• American was cleared to cross at YA
• Republic was cleared to cross at F
• Crossing traffic were asked to expedite (no delay)
• Swiss rejected their takeoff

Points to consider while listening to the recording:

• The request for the crossing to traffic to cross with ‘no delay’ suggesting an awareness from the controller of a potential conflict, or the possibility of one
• The tone from the tower controller towards Swiss regarding their requirement to take 31L as an exit 
• The lack of follow up discussion with Swiss prior to their next departure attempt (this may have occurred later on frequency)

For a full (and visual) rundown of the event, we suggest watching this video from VASAviation.

How did this happen?

KJFK/New York is an extremely busy airport with multiple runways. Aircraft on the ground are regularly required to cross active runways during their taxi, and US airports do not always have stop bar lights. The airport is extremely busy with a large number of international traffic which may not be familiar with the airport layout.

There are also numerous tower and ground frequencies. Runway 04L is controlled by Tower on frequency 123.9. The same frequency controls runway 13R/31L which crosses 04L while Tower frequency 119.1 controls 04R and 13L/31R. Ground is 121.9, with a separate frequency for Ramp which aircraft are required to check in on during taxi in order to confirm their ramp entry and gate availability so they can advise Ground (who does not talk directly with Ramp).

The Tower controller clearing Swiss for takeoff during this event was not the same controller clearing aircraft to cross.

Convoluted? Yeah.

The result? 

• Lack of coordination between ATC: Different controllers handling the active runways and ground automatically leads to a reduction in their awareness of traffic movements handled by other frequencies 
• Distractions for crew: Managing the frequencies and radio procedures is challenging for crew, and combined with the high workload for ATC and for the crew, this can lead to distractions and miscommunications or errors on both sides
• Loss of situational awareness by crew: Without listening in on the tower frequency, crew do not have as much awareness of other traffic movements and are reliant on ATC to clear them safely
• A significant reduction in safety margins for all traffic involved: Runway incursions can lead to catastrophic accidents. 

What can be done?

This events, while rare, represent a huge reduction in safety and the potential for a catastrophic accidents. While this one will be investigated, and no judgement is being made here of what led to this, beyond the obvious challenges that this airport does have due to its layout, it is important to consider actions that can be taken now to help mitigate similar instances.

1. Better awareness: Aircraft turning onto runways must make sure they have their strobe lights switched on. In the USA (but a good idea everywhere), landing lights should only be turned on once a clearance for takeoff has been received. 

Aircraft crossing runways should ensure they check for landing lights and confirm runway clear prior to crossing. Crew should not assume that because an aircraft beside them is crossing, that it is automatically safe to do so – confirm your clearance!

2. Listen out: Aircraft on the ground, particularly those crossing active runways, should try where able to monitor tower frequencies if not automatically transferred. Aircraft departing are unable as it would increase distraction and the risk of callsign confusion and accepting clearances for meant for them.

All crew should monitor for calls which may indicate a conflict, and should maintain sterile cockpits while operating at airports with multiple runways and complex taxi routings. 

Changes in tone (both for crew and for controllers) and more awareness of communications between the two roles should be encouraged. This may help identify workload and capacity issues and allow one role to better support the other, or to identify potential for errors and mistakes.

3. Limit distractions: Calls to ‘ramp’, checklists and other distractions should be limited and avoided until active runways have been crossed and it is appropriate and safe to continue them.

Controllers should avoid distracting calls to crew during critical times ie the landing roll as this may result in errors and mistakes and a loss of monitoring and awareness.

4. Reduce workload and avoid pressure: Controllers should avoid giving long clearances to crew as these are more likely to lead to aircraft taxying incorrectly. 

At busy airports, ATCOs should not be pressured to maintain unsafe levels of efficiency (traffic movements) and should be able to ‘slow it down’ when they need to. Likewise, they should not pressure crew with rushed clearances or requests to expedite if it can be avoided.

Crew can help reduce their own workload and chances of taxi errors by briefing in advance, and stopping and re-briefing if changes occur. 

5. Work together: ATC and crew need to work together better. KJFK is a known ‘problem spot’ where controllers and crew often become combative towards one another. 

Crew must be able to reconfirm clearances without risk of aggressive responses, and should feel comfortable declining a request if they feel margins might be compromised. This should be encouraged as it enables crew to become an extra line of defence when errors may occur.

These aren’t all the answers, but they are some of the barriers which may help prevent similar events.

Changes are coming… but may take a while.

There are several projects already underway to help combat this at the root level.

The FAA announced earlier in April that all major airports (starting with Austin-Bergstrom, Indianapolis, Nashville and Dallas Love Field) will be seeing systems installed over the next few years to improve ATCO awareness of traffic and movements on the ground. The systems use ADS-B to provide controllers with surface traffic data at airports where surface surveillance is not installed.

A major report into ATC fatigue levels was released just a few days ago. This hopes to address the staff shortages within ATC, and to look into working hours and other human factors which are impacting ATC performance, and which need improving.

ANCC Call to Action

ANCC want to introduce collaborative training for ATCOs and Pilots. This will help improve awareness and understanding between the roles by:

• Discussing common areas of operation where Pilot and ATCO interactions can be challenging
• Building awareness of common misconceptions and miscommunication threats between the roles
• Supporting development of CRM/TRM, teamwork and better interactions between the roles
• Providing a safe space to have conversations, share insights and learn from one another

Please get in touch for more information on the resources and workshops ANCC offer, at te**@**cc.group